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Orrin G. Hatch† 
It’s hard to believe that it’s been thirty years since 
Congressman Henry Waxman and I joined together to pass the 
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 
commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act. The articles that 
follow in this issue of the William Mitchell Law Review are a 
testament to the continued success of this legislation in spurring 
the development and marketing of generic drugs while providing 
unprecedented new intellectual property incentives designed to 
encourage continued investment in new medicines by brand name 
drug companies. More importantly, the ongoing debate reminds us 
that to maintain this momentum, we need to continuously look for 
the most effective and efficient means of incentivizing development 
of lifesaving drugs while ensuring that those drugs are widely 
available to the American people. 
I like to think that I’ve kept up with how Hatch-Waxman is 
faring after thirty years, but I’ll be the first to admit that there are 
many commentators, some of whose work appears in this very issue, 
who can provide a far more detailed analysis of the current issues 
than I will provide here. What I hope you will find more 
interesting, and perhaps even insightful, is the story of how the 
Hatch-Waxman Act came to be—the triumphs and tribulations of 
the legislative process that don’t make it into the legislative history.1 
The state of the pharmaceutical industry in the 1980s is well 
documented. Major research companies were increasingly 
frustrated with spending hundreds of millions of dollars to develop 
a new product, only to see its patent life undercut by delays in the 
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 1.  For further background on the Hatch-Waxman Act, see ORRIN HATCH, 
SQUARE PEG: CONFESSIONS OF A CITIZEN SENATOR 70–81 (2002). 
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approval of new drugs by the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA). Meanwhile, the domestic generic pharmaceutical industry 
was realizing only a fraction of its potential. The handful of existing 
companies were struggling because they could not afford to 
replicate the same expensive and time-consuming safety and 
efficacy trials undertaken by the pioneer firms, as the FDA required 
them to do, and still sell the drug at a reduced price.2 
In sum, the FDA’s regulatory system was discouraging brand 
innovator companies from investing in new research and 
development. At the same time, it was blocking the introduction of 
low-cost generic products. No one was benefiting—not the brand 
companies, not the generic firms, and not consumers. Yet neither 
the brands nor the generics could push legislation through 
Congress to address their respective problems; each side had 
enough clout to stop the other’s legislative initiatives. Any 
legislative solution—and one was desperately needed—would have 
to address the concerns of both. 
I recognized the need for reform shortly after becoming 
chairman of the U.S. Senate Committee on Labor and Human 
Resources in 1981. Despite the obvious need for reform at the FDA 
and relief not only for brand and generic manufacturers, but more 
importantly, for the American people, it was slow going. It took 
three years of countless meetings and hearings before I succeeded 
in convincing both Congress and the public that this was 
something that needed to be done. More importantly, by that point 
I was confident that my staff and I finally understood the positions 
of the various interested parties and what they really needed, as 
opposed to what they demanded in public. In the spring of 1984, 
however, political realities were threatening any hope of progress. 
The end of the session was quickly approaching, and because 1984 
was a presidential election year, the Senate was already beginning 
to slide into the traditional partisan bickering and posturing that 
dominate the lead up to a major election. If there was to be any 
hope of passing a bill under these circumstances, I knew that I 
needed a strong bipartisan showing. 
I found a willing ally in Representative Henry Waxman, the 
liberal Democrat from California and, at the time, the chairman of 
 
 2.  See generally CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, HOW INCREASED COMPETITION FROM 
GENERIC DRUGS HAS AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL 
INDUSTRY (1998). 
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the House Health Subcommittee. If I thought securing such a 
respected Democratic ally would pave the way for progress, I was 
miscalculating the degree of animosity between the brand 
companies and generics. I invited a handful of industry leaders to 
meet with me personally in my office over several weeks. Not 
surprisingly, both sides were extremely skeptical of the other’s 
intentions. Each thought the other’s position was not only illogical 
but also self-serving. 
The brand companies, led by Jack Stafford, the CEO of 
American Home Products, wanted legislation completely restoring 
every day of patent life lost while their approvals were being 
processed by the FDA. They needed a greater period of market 
exclusivity to recover the high cost of their research. Bill Haddad, 
representing the generics, disagreed. He responded that a drug’s 
patent life might be shorter than that for other products, but the 
prices that could be charged were so disproportionate to the cost of 
production that immense profits could be realized in short periods 
of time. 
Bill went on to insist that the generics needed to be able to 
bring a generic version of a drug to market immediately upon the 
expiration of the patent, without having to go through the 
extremely costly, time-consuming, and unnecessarily repetitive 
exercise of re-proving that the drug was safe. The brand companies 
responded that the generic firms were not real pharmaceutical 
companies. They didn’t have adequate personnel, laboratories, or 
experience. They could not be trusted to make effective products 
on their own, and they posed a real health risk to an unsuspecting 
public. 
Our discussions turned to a draft bill, and they proceeded to 
argue about every word. I pushed and prodded, alternating 
between being supportive and critical. At times, I was more of a 
therapist than a legislator, as I struggled to keep the discussion 
impersonal and constructive. The accusations continued, day after 
day. Toward the end of every session, either Bill or Jack would 
explode in a rage, swear off the negotiations, and stomp out of the 
room. 
One day, Bill and Jack got angry at the same time. Jumping to 
their feet, they rushed to the door, shouting and blaming each 
other for the bill’s lack of progress. Amazingly, they reached the 
frame simultaneously. Not wanting the other to win on anything, 
they both tried to jump through and smacked their heads. There 
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was a loud thud, and both stumbled back into the room, groaning 
in pain. I had been dreaming about doing just that for days. I had 
to turn away so they wouldn’t catch me smiling. 
In fairness, I wasn’t immune to the pressure, either. After 
about a week, Jack was in the middle of one of his prolonged 
objections, refusing to let Bill interrupt to make a point. Bill just 
started talking. Soon, both were yelling, each trying to drown out 
the other. I leapt to my feet and slapped the table as hard as 
I could. “If you guys don’t stop it, I’m going to kill somebody,” 
I yelled, the words garbled but clear enough. The room fell silent. 
Both were dumbstruck. Murder was probably the only threat that 
they had not yet made, and they were clearly not expecting it to 
come from me. They stared at me in shock. I’m sure at that point 
I looked crazy enough to make good on the threat. 
I know. It wasn’t exactly my proudest moment. It certainly 
wasn’t my most insightful negotiating tactic, yet amazingly, it 
worked. The discussion began again, but now Bill and Jack were 
competing to see who could be more courteous and subdued. Over 
time, we narrowed the issues in contention, reaching agreement on 
a variety of secondary problems. Ultimately, the brand companies 
decided they had more to gain by passing legislation than by 
stopping it and agreed in principle to the concept of a rapid 
generic approval process at the FDA. In exchange, the brand 
companies received patent term extensions or restorations to 
provide a greater period of market exclusivity. Once that occurred, 
everything else fell into place, and we quickly reached an 
agreement. 
Some might be surprised by the amount of industry 
involvement with legislation of this kind, but it was critical. Quite 
simply, only someone experienced with the industry could 
understand the nuances and consequences of legislative wording. 
Great care had to be taken because we were changing the rules for 
a process that was ongoing. While we were negotiating, innovator 
and generic drugs were working their way through the approval 
process. Without proper care, it would be easy to unintentionally 
eliminate an entire product line with language that would appear 
completely logical and legitimate on its face. 
After weeks of private negotiations, when the deal was finally 
made public, a majority in Congress recognized the agreement for 
what it was: a balanced compromise that refocused federal 
regulatory drug policy on innovation and research while creating 
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for the first time the real possibility of a vibrant generic industry 
that could save consumers billions of dollars. 
Yet it takes more than just a good bill to get a vote in the U.S. 
Senate. Congress was getting ready to adjourn before the coming 
election, with literally only days left in the session. At that point, for 
a bill to move through the Senate, it would have had to be 
approved unanimously. Despite last-minute opposition, the bill was 
called up, approved, and adopted, without a recorded vote, by 
unanimous consent. Just a few days later, President Ronald Reagan 
signed the bill into law.3 
The far-reaching impact of the Hatch-Waxman Act continues 
to be felt today, three decades after that flurry of legislative activity 
came to a close. While most other costs in the health care system 
have gone through the roof, generic pharmaceuticals have saved 
consumers, health care providers, businesses, insurers, and the 
government an enormous amount of money. According to the 
most recent data available, the use of generic medicines resulted in 
$217 billion in savings in the U.S. health care system in 2012, and 
$1.2 trillion from 2003 to 2012.4 There’s no reason to believe that 
this tremendous growth won’t continue in the years to come. 
These cost savings come from a variety of sources: 
Prior to the implementation of the Hatch-Waxman 
Act, 35% of top-selling drugs had generic competitors 
after patent expiration; now almost all do. The Generic 
Pharmaceutical Association points out that of 12,751 
drugs listed in the Orange Book [the FDA’s publication of 
approved drugs], 10,072 have generic substitutes available 
to consumers. Concurrently, the time to market for these 
generic products has decreased substantially. According 
to the Congressional Budget Office, in 1984 the average 
time between the expiration of a patent on a brand name 
drug and the availability of a generic was three years. 
Today, upon FDA approval a generic may be introduced 
immediately after patents on the innovator drug expire as 
companies are permitted to undertake clinical testing 
during the time period associated patents are in force.5 
 
 3.  See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-
Waxman) Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585. 
 4.  GENERIC PHARM. ASS’N, GENERIC DRUG SAVINGS IN THE U.S. 1 (5th ed. 
2013); see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-371R, DRUG PRICING: 
RESEARCH ON SAVINGS FROM GENERIC DRUG USE 9–11 (2012). 
 5.  WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41114, 
5
Hatch: The 30th Anniversary of the Hatch-Watchman Act: Foreword
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2014
 
2014] FOREWORD 1199 
While these achievements deserve recognition by all 
Americans, we cannot rest on the laurels of this legislative 
achievement from thirty years ago. The pharmaceutical industry 
today differs significantly from what it was in the early 1980s when 
Jack and Bill were bashing heads in my office. “The cost of 
developing a drug has doubled, as has the number of clinical trials 
necessary to file a new drug application. The number of 
participants required for these trials has tripled. As the rate of 
return on investments in a new drug declined 12%, manufacturers 
often spend [research and development] dollars on developing 
improved versions of . . . an existing product” rather than taking 
risks to explore uncharted territory.6 
We struck a balance thirty years ago—a balance in which not 
only brand companies and generics, but the American people, 
came out ahead. Is that still the appropriate balance today? I 
believe that the foundation laid by the Hatch-Waxman Act thirty 
years ago will continue to be the mechanism by which the 
government incentivizes development of lifesaving drugs while 
ensuring that those drugs are accessible to the American people. 
Nevertheless, we have an obligation to periodically reevaluate how 
the balance can be adjusted to account for the sweeping changes in 
the broader health care sector. 
The articles that follow demonstrate how the success of the 
Hatch-Waxman Act inspires ideas on how to improve the effects of 
the Act through additional legislation, how to safeguard the correct 
judicial interpretation of legislative intent behind the Act, how to 
ensure the correct application of the Act by the FDA, and how to 
imitate the Act’s profound positive effects to benefit American 
medical device consumers. 
In this anniversary year, I want to applaud the scholarship on 
these issues. By looking not only at the tremendous benefits that 
have flowed from the Hatch-Waxman Act, but also how our 
pharmaceutical and broader health care industries can continue to 
adapt to changing times, we are building on the progress we’ve 
made over the last thirty years so we can make sure that Americans 
young and old continue to reap the benefits of this important law. 
ORRIN G. HATCH 
 
THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT: OVER A QUARTER CENTURY LATER, at i (2012). 
 6.  Id. 
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